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Abstract. Despite a legal framework being in place for several years, the market 
share  of  qualified  electronic  signatures  is  disappointingly  low.  Mobile  Signatures 
provide a new and promising opportunity for the deployment of an infrastructure for 
qualified electronic signatures.  We that SIM-based signatures are the most secure and 
convenient  solution.  However,  using  the  SIM-card  as  a  secure  signature  creation 
device (SSCD) raises new challenges, because it would contain the user’s private key 
as well as the subscriber identification. Combining both functions in one card raises 
the question who will have the control over the keys and certificates. We propose a 
protocol called Certification on Demand (COD) that separates certification services 
from subscriber identification information and allows consumers to choose their ap-
propriate certification services and service providers based on their needs. This infra-
structure could be used to enable secure mobile brokerage services that can ommit the 
necessity of TAN lists and therefore allow a better integration of information and 
transaction services. 
1   Introduction 
In  the  directive  1999/93/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
[ECDir1999] legal requirements for a common introduction of electronic signatures 
in Europe were enacted. The directive sets a framework of requirements for security 
of technology used for electronic signatures. Based on certificates issued by certifica-
tion authorities, which certify public keys for a person registered by a registration 
authority, electronic signatures can be created with a so-called “secure signature crea-
tion device” (SSCD), carrying the private keys of a person. 
The EC-directive distinguishes between “electronic signatures” and “advanced elec-
tronic signatures” [ECDir1999]. An advanced electronic signature is defined as an 
electronic signature that meets the following requirements: 
 
“(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; 
 
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory; 
 (c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain 
under his sole control; and 
 
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a 
manner that any subsequent change of the data is 
detectable;” [ECDir1999] 
 
Certification Service Providers can issue certificates for advanced signatures that will 
be qualified if they meet the requirements of Annex I of the directive. Those ad-
vanced signatures with qualified certificates will be refered to in this paper as quali-
fied signatures. 
In  Germany  and  Austria,  the  local  implementation  of  the  EC  directive  requires 
evaluation  of  the  SSCD  to  be  done  against  ITSEC  E4  or  CC  EAL  4+  levels 
[FuFr2000]. For directory services, stringent 24/7 availability and durability is re-
quired. Revocation lists and other feasible technology must be available to all accept-
ing parties of signed documents. The EU suggests the implementation of a public 
evaluation infrastructure under control of a government authority. Germany has al-
ready implemented a system of evaluation service companies, evaluation consulting 
companies and the Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications [RegTP2004] as 
the responsible government authority. 
The deployment of signature card products focused so far on smart cards with evalua-
tion against the requirements for lawful electronic signatures. Based on these, per-
sonal computer based signature applications have entered the market. These applica-
tions require smart card readers attached to the workstation, thereby preventing user 
mobility. 
The  market share  of  EC-directive  conforming smart cards is disappointingly low, 
failing to meet any involved party’s expectations. This has partly been blamed on the 
incompatibility and missing standards of existing products. Also the lack of custom-
ers prevents companies from investing in signature products. As a result almost no 
commercial usage for qualified electronic signatures exists. Consequently no custom-
ers seek to obtain signature products. 
There are numerous activities trying to enlarge the potential consumer base like put-
ting key pairs on national identity cards [FSEID2004]. Lately there have been some 
efforts towards mobile signatures [ETSI] [Raddic2004] and this approach might have 
a chance to break up the deadlock of missing customers and missing applications. 
However, there are numerous problems to be solved, before qualified signatures can 
be created with a mobile device. 
2   Mobile Signatures 
Mobile signatures are electronic signatures which are created using a mobile device 
and rely on signature or certification services in a location independent telecommuni-
cation  environment.  They  allow  signatory  mobility  beyond  fixed,  secure  desktop 
workstation with trusted, personal signing equipment [FrRaRo2003]. Although using 
mobile  devices  for  signature  creation  has  several  shortcomings  (e.g.  display  size, communication costs, limited computing power), the high market penetration of cell 
phones [GSM2004] and the mobility gained make this effort potentially successful 
and promising. 
Two possible signing approaches in the mobile environment have been proposed in 
the  past:  signatures  created  in  centralized  signing  server  environments  located  at 
service providers like mobile network carriers; and electronic signatures created in-
side the signer’s mobile device using a smart card.  
2.1   Server Based Electronic Signatures  
It has been shown in [Ross04] that server based mobile electronic signatures can not 
achieve the status of advanced electronic signatures [ECDir1999]. 
According to Art.2, 2(c) the signature has to be created by means that the signatory 
can maintain under his sole control [ECDir1999]. By giving away the users private 
key to store it on a server this premise can not be fulfilled [Ross04].  
2.2   Client Based Electronic Signatures 
Signatures can be created inside the mobile device using a secure signature creation 
device which has to fulfill the requirements of Annex III. Using a multiple smart card 
solution, the signature smart card, certified by a certification provider, is inserted into 
the mobile device which already contains the usual SIM-card. Therefore, the signa-
ture process takes place on the mobile device and the user is able to use basically any 
signature card available on the market. This can be achieved by either exchanging the 
SIM-card with the signature card (Dual Chip) or by having an additional chip card 
reader within the mobile device (Dual Slot). The first solution is very inconvenient 
for the signatory since he has to switch of the phone to exchange the cards for the 
signature creation and again to use the phone functionality. In the latter case a spe-
cialized mobile phone is required that has multiple smart card slots which almost 
none of the current mobile phones do. 
It would also be possible to use a single smart card that contains the SIM telephone 
functions, as well as the secure signature creation device. This can be achieved either 
by leaving some free space on the SIM-card, on which the components of the signa-
ture creation device can be installed later on, or by shipping SIM-cards with prein-
stalled signature functionality that has to be initialized and activated.  
We propose the usage of evaluated smart cards suitable for qualified electronic signa-
tures which are extended by the SIM functionality and usable through a unified inter-
face, e.g. with the USIM1 specification TS 21.111 [3GPPSpec]. Another approach 
might be the migration and evaluation of USIM with a full WAP2/WIM3 implementa-
tion for the purpose of lawful mobile signing [WAPF2004]. Evaluation must be car-
                                                            
1 Universal Subsriber Identity Module 
2 Wireless Application Protocol 
3 Wireless Identity Module ried out with ITSEC or Common Criteria within an evaluation process similar to the 
evaluation summarized in [FuFr2000]. 
3   Challenges of SIM Based Signatures 
Using a single smart card for both functionalities provides the most convenient solu-
tion for the signatory. He can sign documents and distribute them via communication 
services of his cell phone like GPRS4 or UMTS5. To ensure that the requirements of 
Art.2 2(c) are met, it is necessary to provide some sort of reliable access control to the 
signature functions. The usual PIN used to control the access to the telephone func-
tions is not sufficient, since users can keep their phones and SIMs unlocked for con-
venience. Like traditional signature cards, SIM-cards can be certified according to 
security evaluation criteria and are under control of the user. 
However, using a single smart card for multiple purposes raises new questions and 
challenges.  The  SIM-card is  issued  by  the telecommunication  provider, while the 
SSCD is issued by a certification service provider. Combining both functions in one 
card raises the question who will have the control over the keys and certificates. 
The simple solution is that the deploying carrier also initializes the signature secrets 
to act as a trust provider for their customers. This seems to be reasonable at first 
glance, since some of the european carriers already own and maintain trust centers 
(i.e. Deutsche Telekom), but there are several shortcomings, which make this ap-
proach unpractical. 
First of all the customer wants to leave the store with his SIM-card right away, so he 
can use his mobile phone instead of waiting several weeks for the certification proc-
ess to be completed. Furthermore, binding the keys to a carrier creates a great hin-
drance for the customer to switch to a cheaper carrier in the future. From the carriers 
point of view this would of course be a positive effect. From the customer’s perspec-
tive, however, it would be much better to be able to choose freely between different 
certification service providers. 
Also due to the lack of success of the signature market so far most providers probably 
do not want to invest in building and maintaining their own trust center to provide 
certification services. In addition, they don’t want to change their distribution chan-
nels unless they expect an increase in revenue. 
Therefore, a different solution for mobile signing and certification is needed, that 
allows separation of subscriber information and certification services. 
4   Certification on Demand 
The mobile operator could sell SIM-cards equipped with a key generator for one or 
more key pair(s) which can be used for the signing functionality. After obtaining the 
SIM-card from the mobile operator, the customer can then generate the keys and 
                                                            
4 General Packet Radio System 
5 Universal Mobile Telecommunication System activate the signature component and the public key(s) can be certified by any Certi-
fication Service Provider on demand. 
Through the separation of the telephone functionality and the (possibly later) certifi-
cation of the user’s identity by a certification service provider, both functions can be 
sold separately and can be obtained from different providers. 
The carrier will probably face increased costs for the signature capable SIM-card but 
can also expect increasing traffic caused by signature services. All distribution chan-
nels will remain unchanged. 
Figure 2 illustrates the necessary steps for the distribution of the SIM-card and the 
certification process. 
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Fig. 1:  Certification on Demand Protocol 
1.  The carrier gives his IMSI6/Ki7 pairs to a card manufacturer. 
2.  The card manufacturer returns a SIM card containing an IMSI/Ki pair, a key 
generator for the signature application and the public key of the RootCA to the 
carrier. 
                                                            
6 International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
7 Individual subscriber authentication key 3.  The SIM card is sold to the customer and the carrier provides a nullpin that is 
used to generate the keys and activate the signing functionality. 
4.  The customer generates the keys and activates the signing functionality by en-
tering the nullpin.  
5.  The customer registers at a Registration Authority of his choice, providing 
identification information and his public key. 
6.  The customer sends his identification information signed with his private key 
over the air to the Certification Authority.  
7.  The Registration Authority sends the public key and the identification infor-
mation to the Certification Authority. 
8.  If the information provided by the customer and the Registration Authority 
match, the Certification Authority issues a certificate for the customer and 
sends it over the air to his mobile phone. 
9.  The user can verify the validity of his certificate by checking the certificate is-
sued by the RootCA of the Certification Service Provider. 
 
This protocol makes no changes to the existing distribution infrastructure of mobile 
operators. The steps 1 to 3 remain the same way they used to be before, apart from 
the fact that the card manufactures puts additional information and functionality (sig-
nature key generator, public key of RootCA) on the SIM card. In order to ensure that 
the card manufacturer does not know the private key of the user the key generation 
should be done by the card. The customer is not forced to certify his keys and can use 
the SIM for telephone functionality only. He could also activate the signing function-
ality without going through the certification process for example as a security token. 
If  he  wants  to  be  able  to  make  legal  binding  electronic  signatures,  he  has  to  go 
through the complete process to obtain a qualified certificate. He can do this by freely 
choosing the CSP.  
The nullpin to generate the keys and activate the signing functionality in step 4 is 
used to ensure that no signatures can be created before the customer has control over 
the SIM card. If the signature application has been activated before, the user will 
recognize this when entering the nullpin.  
Step 6 could be omitted but serves as insurance for the customer to ensure him that   
the integrity of his identification information will be preserved. 
If the customer wants to change his CSP, he only has to repeat steps 5 to 9 with his 
new CSP. If the customer wants to change his carrier, he has to go through the whole 
protocol again, but can register with his current Certification Service Provider.  
5  Securing Mobile Brokerage 
In recent years, financial services were expected as one of the key commercial drivers 
for the mobile commerce market [Forr2003]. As we know today, the market devel-
opment of mobile financial services including mobile banking and brokerage services 
has not lived up to these expectations. Reconsidering the implementations of mobile 
financial services available, so far we can find that they are mostly reproductions of 
their (widely successful) web-based counterparts. This applies accordingly to the used security mechanisms.  Consequently, they do not utilize their special features deriving 
from the mobility and infrastructural aspect. For example checking out the balance of 
accounts or requesting stock prices might be pastime but does normally not provide 
added value for customers and using transaction numbers for authorizing transactions 
while being on the way is inconvenient. 
As research has shown [MuGu2004] [Munt2004] company announcements can have 
significant short term price effects on corresponding stock prices. If a private investor 
holds any stocks of the company, the portfolio value can be affected dramatically. As 
the resulting price effects can be very promptly and completed within a short time 
frame, investors should be notified and enabled to react immediately. 
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Fig. 2. Time conversion of the first five price fixings (n=172) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that nearly 80% of the first five price fixings can be observed 
within the first 30 minutes following the publication (arithmetic mean of 23.2 min-
utes). Therefore, an integration of mobile notification and transaction services, in-
cluding prompt transaction authorization, is required if observed price effects persist 
for a short period of time only. 
This can not be achieved with the traditional concept of online brokerage services.  
An SMS message containing a relevant notification does not provide any protection of 
integrity or authenticity. A potential attacker will be able to pose as the news feed 
server sending false notifications.  
Also it is very inconvenient for the investor to scan and enter a transaction number 
being pressed for time. Furthermore, the investor has to carry a list of TANs at all 
times in order to be able to react to incoming notifications. This increases the risk of 
potential theft or loss of the TAN list. 
Using  mobile  signatures  the  integrity  and  authenticity  of  the  notification  can  be 
checked by the investor. It also enables a secure integration of notification and trans-action services providing authenticity and integrity for the transactions that are made 
by the investor.  
A COD infrastructure allows financial institutions to certify and enable mobile sub-
scribers to use banking services online through their mobile terminal and SIM. Cre-
dentials could be certified by the bank itself, like the credentials used on bank cards. 
Therefore, the bank can still have the control over the credentials while the mobile 
operator still can issue the SIM cards without giving their IMSI/Ki pairs away to the 
bank.  
8  Conclusion 
Mobile Signatures are a promising approach to break the deadlock between missing 
customers and missing applications. The high market penetration of mobile phones 
enables certificication service providers to target millions of potential customers. We 
analyzed two possible signing approaches (server based and client based signatures) 
and conclude that SIM-based signatures are the most secure and convenient solution. 
However, using the SIM as an SSCD seems to force the mobile operator to act as a 
trust provider and therefore to challenge the existing CSPs in a market that hasn’t 
been successful so far. We proposed a protocol called Certification on Demand that 
seperates  subscriber  information  from  certification  services  and  therefore  enables 
both industries to cooperate instead of compete with each other. 
This infrastructure could be used to enable secure mobile brokerage services that can 
ommit the necessity of TAN lists and therefore allow a better integration of informa-
tion and transaction services. 
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